

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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INFO USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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EO 11652: NA

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD-FIRST DRAFT OF CHAPTER III OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE  
ZONE STUDY

DISTO

1. AT JULY 8 MEETING OF NWFZ EXPERTS, SECRETARIAT  
DISTRIBUTED FIRST DRAFT OF CHAPTER III (CONCEPT OF NWFZ'S)  
OF STUDY (TEXT BELOW). SECRETARIAT REQUESTED COMMENTS  
IN WRITING WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. BULK OF REST OF STUDY WAS  
PROMISED BY END OF WEEK. AT SAME MEETING, MEXICAN  
WORKING PAPERS ON VERIFICATION AND CONTROL AND ON NWFZ'S  
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, AUSTRALIAN WORKING PAPER ON  
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND REGIONAL FUEL CYCLE  
CENTERS, AND IAEA WORKING PAPER ON VERIFICATION AND  
CONTROL WERE ALSO CIRCULATED. WORKING PAPERS POUCHED  
ACDA/IR, OSD/ISA, AND HCS-J5(IN)

2.COMMENT. WE ARE PREPARING COMMENTS ON DRAFT CHAPTER  
III ON BASIS OF PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS (STATE 146123). WE  
WILL, OF COURSE, MAKE CLEAR THAT DELEGATIONS'S COMMENTS  
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ARE TENTATIVE AND STUDY WILL BE REVIEWED IN WASHINGTON.

MEANWHILE WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER GUIDANCE  
DEPT CAN SUPPLY IN TIME TO BE INCORPORATED IN OUR  
COMMENTS ON CHAPTER III.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

### III CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON FREE ZONES

#### 1. OBJECTIVES

1. THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES HAS BEEN THE MOTIVATION TO SPARE NATIONS THE THREAT OF INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR WAR OR BEING THREATENED BY NUCLEAR ATTACK, AND THEREBY TO MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION AS A MEASURE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES STEMMED FROM THE EARLY AND WIDENING REALIZATION THAT A NUMBER OF STATES IN MANY REGIONS

OF THE WORLD HAVE OR COULD HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON PRODUCTION AND DELIVERY CAPABILITY WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD; THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MORE STATES MAY DECIDE TO DO SO; THAT IF THIS OCCURRED IT COULD PRESENT NEW THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF STATES IN AREAS AT PRESENT FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THAT IT COULD PRECIPITATE A RUINOUSLY EXPENSIVE AND PERILOUS NUCLEAR ARMS AND DELIVERY RACE IN THESE AREAS; AND COULD ADD NEW DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WAR TO AN ALREADY DANGEROUS WORLD. THERE HAS, FURTHERMORE, BEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEELING IN MANY STATES THAT THE EXISTING MACHINERY FOR THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION HAS PROVED NOT TO BE FULLY SUFFICIENT. THE RAPID INCREASE OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, AND ITS POTENTIALITY AS MATERIAL BASIS FOR THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ADDS A POWERFUL ADDITIONAL FACTOR IN THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS CLOSER EXAMINATION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES.

2. THE BASIC PURPOSES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES MAY BE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED. THE OBJECTIVES ARE TO ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AND WAR BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE AREA, TO REMOVE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE AREA BEING INVOLVED IN A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND TO ENSURE THAT NO MEMBER OF IT WOULD BE THE VICTIM OF A NUCLEAR ATT-  
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ACK. VIEWED ON A BROADER SCALE, THE PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL AND MORE EFFECTIVE MACHINERY TO AVERT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND THEIR INEVITABLE GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES. IT IS THUS ARGUED THAT NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES PROVIDE COMPLEMENTARY MACHINERY TO GENERAL MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATIONS, AND MUST NOT BE REGARDED AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, BUT RATHER AS A POWERFUL INSTRUMENT TO ENSURE ITS EFFECTIVENESS. WHILE THE NUC-

LEAR-WWAPON-FREE ZONE CONCEPT MAY NOT BE PRACTICAL IN ALL AREAS, IT PURPOSE IS TO ENSURE THAT IN PARTICULAR AREAS, THE GOVERNMENTS AGREE NOT TO BUILD, NOR TO PURCHASE, NOR TO RECEIVE, NOR TO DEPLOY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

(A) SECURITY OF STATES INCLUDED IN THE ZONE

3. THE PREMISE UPON WHICH ANY NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE MUST BE BASED WILL BE THE CONVICTION OF STATES THAT THEIR VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS WOULD BE ENHANCED AND NOT JEOPARDIZED BY PARTICIPATION. THE PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY IS, OBVIOUSLY A MATTER OF NATIONAL POLICY, AND THESE PERCEPTIONS CHANGE, BUT ONE OF THE MOST PERVASIVE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD IN FAVOUR OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE CONCEPT IS THAT THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A REGION THREATENS THE SECURITY OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, AND NOT EXCLUDING THE POSSESSOR OF THE WEAPONS OR THE COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY ARE DEPLOYED. THERE IS, ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ARGUED, A CONJUNCTION OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS IN REGIONS WHERE THESE WEAPONS DO NOT EXIST IN PRESERVING A NON-NUCLEAR STATUS QUO. IT WILL BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE SITUATION IN AREAS WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ALREADY DEPLOYED WILL BE DIFFERENT, AND WILL RAISE PARTICULAR ISSUES FOR THE SECURITY OF STATES; THIS WOULD HAVE TO FORM A MAJOR PART OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE.

4. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AREAS IN THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS, GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION, AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, MAKES GENERALIZATION HAZARDOUS, BUT A VITAL PREREQUISITE TO THE SUCCESS OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE WOULD BE COMMON AGREEMENT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT AND POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ANY MEMBER WAS PERILOUS TO THE AREA AS A WHOLE, THAT THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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DIRECT NATIONAL INTEREST OF ALL MEMBERS LAY IN THE ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE AREA AND THAT THE EXISTING NUCLEAR POWERS AGREE NOT TO INTRODUCE NOR TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE AREA. THE ROLE OF THE PRESENT NUCLEAR POWERS COULD BE CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE CONCEPT IN SEVERAL WAYS: FIRST TO COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO USE OR THREATEN NUCLEAR FORCE AGAINST A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE; SECOND, TO AGREE NOT TO SUPPLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ANY MEMBER OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE, AND, THIRD, TO AGREE NOT TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THE AREA OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE. IN THOSE REGIONS WHERE ACUTE TENSIONS EXIST WHICH COULD LEAD TO MILITARY CONFLICT, THE DANGERS OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE ARE PARTICULARLY

ACUTE AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE, IF PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT.

5. THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT WHICH HAS BEEN EMPHASIZED BY SEVERAL COMMENTATORS, WHO POINT TO THE LONGER-TERM MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY POSSIBILITIES OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES, PARTICULARLY IN THOSE AREAS OF ACUTE TENSION. THE EXPONENTS OF THIS ARGUMENT CONSIDER THAT THE CREATION OF AN EFFECTIVE ZONE WOULD IN ITSELF REDUCE SUCH TENSIONS, AND COULD LEAD TO REGIONAL ARMS LIMITATIONS MEASURES AND CO-OPERATION ON WIDER ISSUES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS ARGUED THAT THE REDUCTION OF TENSION MUST PRECEDE THE CREATION OF A TRULY EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE.

6. ALTHOUGH PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY MAY IMPEL NATIONS TOWARDS GOING NUCLEAR IN ORDER TO END THEIR POSITION OF PERMANENT STRATEGIC INFERIORITY TO THE NUCLEAR POWERS, IT IS ARGUED THAT THIS COULD BE RESOLVED BY THE CREATION OF REALLY EFFECTIVE REGIONAL CO-OPERATION TO ENSURE THAT THE ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS LITTLE BEARING ON THE STATUS OF ITS MEMBERS-INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY-WITH THE EXISTING NUCLEAR POWERS. IT IS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THOSE POWERS ARE THEMSELVES MANIFESTLY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE DANGERS OF FURTHER PROLIFERATION; THAT THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ITSELF A SOURCE OF DANGER TO THE POSSESSOR; AND THAT OTHER FACTORS, PARTICULARLY ECONOMIC, ARE OF MUCH GREATER IMPORTANCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS THAN THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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7. THE SUGGESTION HAS ALSO BEEN MADE THAT EXAMINATION SHOULD BE MADE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AD HOC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES SIMILAR TO DEMILITARIZED ZONES FORESEEN IN THE HUMANITARIAN LAWS OF WAR AND PRIMARILY SERVING A HUMANITARIAN PURPOSE. IT IS ARGUED THAT SUCH AD HOC ZONES COULD BE ESTABLISHED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPON COMBATANTS IN TIMES OF WAR OR BY UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY A STATE OR GROUP OF STATES TO MAKE UP THE ZONE IN TIMES OF SEVERE CRISIS. GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF AD HOC ZONES THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SPECIFY IN PEACETIME IN ORDER TO FACILITATE AGREEMENTS IN TIMES OF WAR OR CRISIS, SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE SUBJECT TO A SPECIAL STUDY, AND LIE OUTSIDE OF THIS ONE.

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DISTO

(B) WORLD SECURITY

8. WORLD SECURITY IS INSEPARABLE FROM REGIONAL SECURITY. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE MAKES A POSTIVIE CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE REDUCTION OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ARMS REACE, AND ACCORDINGLY HAS A SIGNIFICANCE THAT EXTENDS BEYOND THE AREA COVERED BY THE ZONE. THIS WOULD BE EVEN MORE TRUE IN THOSE POTENTIAL ZONES WHICH INCLUDE STATES WHICH EITHER POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THEIR OWN OR DEPLOY THOSE OF THE NUCLEAR NATIONS. THUS, ALTHOUGH THE PRIME PURP OSE OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IS REGIONAL SECURITY, IT SHOULD ALSO BE SEEN AS A VITAL PART OF THE PROCESS OF AVERTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND OF ARRESTING THE GLOBAL ARMS RACE. IN THIS PROCESS, IT IS ARGUED, THE INTERESTS OF THE PRESENT NUCLEAR POWERS THEMSELVES ARE INVOLVED. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SINCE 1945 EVENTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED HOW SWIFTLY A REGIONAL CONFLICT FOUGHT WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CAN ESCALATE SHARPLY AND CAN INVOLVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. THUS, IN TERMS OF WORLD SECURITY, THERE ARE TWO DOMINANT FACTORS--THE URGENT NEED TO CURB NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND ALSO TO USE THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE MACHINERY AS PART OF A LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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WIDER STRATEGY OF ARMS-CONTROL AND LIMITATION.

2. PRINCIPLES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZONES: RELEVANCE OF REGIONAL CONSIDERATION

9. AS THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH PARTICULAR NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES MIGHT BE SET UP DIFFER CONSIDERABLY FROM REGION TO REGION, AND THE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL MEMBERS VARY, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE OR REALISTIC TO SET OUT PRECISE GUIDELINES FOR THE CREATION OF ZONES. THE GOVERNMENTS THEMSELVES MUST RESOLVE THEIR OWN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND DETERMINE THEIR IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM NATIONAL INTERESTS. NONETHELESS, THERE IS REAL VALUE IN ESTABLISHING CERTAIN AGREED PRINCIPLES WITHIN WHICH INDIVIDUAL NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE SHOULD COME FROM WITHIN THE POTENTIAL AREA, AND PARTICIPATION MUST BE VOLUNTARY.

(B) THE FUNDAMENTAL COMMITMENT OF ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST BE TO ENSURE THAT THE ZONE WOULD BE, AND WOULD REMAIN, ABSOLUTELY FREE OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING THOSE OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE ZONE.

(C) THE NATURE OF THE ZONE MUST BE SUCH THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS ARE CONVINCED THAT MEMBERSHIP WOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR SECURITY.

(D) THE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD CONTAIN AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION TO ENSURE THE FULL COMPLIANCE BY ITS PARTICIPANTS WITH THE AGREED OBLIGATIONS (SEE CHAPTER V).

(E) THE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE ASSURANCES OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES NOT TO BRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE ZONE SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO A LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT (SEE CHAPTER IV).

(F) THE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT INHIBIT THE ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEMBERS, WHICH COULD INCLUDE INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY.

### 3. SECURITY TREATIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZONES

10. FOR THOSE STATES THAT ARE PARTIES TO ONE OR MORE SECURITY ALLIANCES AND WHO ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE SPECIAL PROBLEMS MIGHT ARISE. THESE NEED NOT BE INSUPERLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ABLE, BUT THEY MIGHT POSE PARTICULAR QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THOSE ALLIANCES WHICH HAVE NUCLEAR POWERS IN THEIR MEMBERSHIP. IN THESE CASES THERE IS OFTEN AN OBLIGATION, WHETHER EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT, FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER TO COME TO THE AID OF ITS ALLY WITH ALL POSSIBLE MEANS IN CASE OF AGGRESSION. THIS NEED NOT, OF COURSE, BE NUCLEAR SUPPORT IN THE ACTUAL EVENT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS. MATTERS ARE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE ISSUE OF DEPLOYMENT, AS MUTUAL ALLIANCE TREATIES OF THIS NATURE CAN AND SOMETIMES DO INVOLVE AGREEMENT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE MAJOR POWER IN THE TERRITORY OF A NON-NUCLEAR ALLY, OR FOR SPECIAL FACILITIES INVOLVING NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

11. THUS, WHILE THERE NEED BE NO INCOMPATIBILITY PER SE BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATION OF A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE IN A NUCLEAR-WEAPONS FREE ZONE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP IN A SECURITY ALLIANCE WHICH INCLUDES NUCLEAR POWERS, IN PRACTICE IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT EACH SITUATION WOULD HAVE TO EXAMINED SEPARATELY. ALL THAT CAN BE SAID AT THIS STAGE IS THAT THE ISSUE OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP OF A SECURITY ALLIANCE OF THIS NATURE AND A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE WOULD BE CRUCIAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ZONE AND AN IMPORTANT ASPECT IN ITS ESTABLISHMENT, AND THAT, AT THE VERY LEAST, THE SITUATION MUST BE MADE CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES.

12. THE QUESTION OF FACILITIES IS ALSO A HIGHLY COMPLEX AREA. WOULD THE AVAILABILITY OF PORT FACILITIES FOR WARSHIPS, SOME OF WHICH MIGHT BE CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OF AIRPORTS OR STAGING FACILITIES FOR AIRCRAFT, SOME OF WHICH MIGHT BE CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BE A MAJOR INFRINGEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE CONCEPT? THERE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT IS CRUCIAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE CONCEPT THAT THE PROVISION OF FACILITIES OF THIS KIND ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH IT, WHILE OTHERS DO NOT RATE IT AS A VERY SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.

#### 4. EXTEND AND COMPOSITION OF ZONES

13. ON THIS MATTER IT SEEMS BOTH IMPRACTICABLE AND UNNECESSARY TO ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH GENERAL RULES, BUT IT WOULD APPEAR THAT CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO A SUCCESSFUL NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH A TRULY EFFECTIVE ZONE WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION IN ONE WAY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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OR ANOTHER OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL OR MILITARY NATIONS IN THE REGION.

14. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD HAVE EXACTLY DEFINED AND UNDERSTOOD FRONTIERS. THIS WOULD NOT PRECLUDE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN PARTICULAR CASES, BUT THE PRINCIPLE IS IMPORTANT. THE PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, COULD PRESENT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES. THESE ARISE WITH PARTICULAR ACUTENESS OVER QUESTIONS OF THE HIGH SEAS AND THE RIGHTS OF NAVIGATION, INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, AND THE VARIOUS ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING TRANSIT. IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT THESE AREAS ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A STUDY OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE-ZONES, OR THAT THEY ARE THE TASK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE. OTHERS, IN CONTENTION, HOLD THEM TO BE A MAJOR PART OF THE ISSUE. HERE IS A LEGAL AND POLITICAL AREA IN WHICH STRONGLY-HELD OPINIONS COLLIDE. THESE MATTERS ARE DEALT WITH AT GREATER LENGTH IN CHAPTER IV.

#### 5. PROCEDURES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZONES

15. IT HAS ALREADY BEEN EMPHASIZED THAT THE INITIATIVE TO CREATE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONES WOULD NORMALLY HAVE TO COME FROM WITHIN THE REGION, AND IT IS SEFLEVIDENT THAT THE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR ITS ESTABLISHMENT WOULD REFLECT THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ZONE AND OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES. IN SOME REGIONS THE EXISTING REGIONAL CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE BODIES FOR INITIATING THE NEGOTIATIONS, IN OTHERS IT MIGHT BE PREFER- ABLE TO ESTABLISH AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS AS IN THE CASES STATES COULD REQUEST THE ASSISTANCE, ADVICE, AND GOOD OFFICES OF OTHER BODIES, NOTABLY THE UN AND THE IAEA, IF THEY SO DESIRED.

16. IT IS ARGUED BY SOME EXPERTS THAT THE INVOLVEMENT OF STATES OUT- SIDE THE ZONE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT PROCESS-AND PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH SPECIAL LINKS TO MEMBERS OF THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE-SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED; OTHERS TAKE THE VIEW THAT WHEREAS THESE STATES NEED NOT NECESSARILY BE EXCLUDED, THEIR INVOLVEMTN SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A RIGHT. IN THOSE AREAS WHERE OUTSIDE NATIONS ARE SUPPOSED TO UNDERTAKE SPECIAL COMMITEMENTS TO THE ZONE, IT WOULD BE EXPECTED THAT THEY WOULD INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS OR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ZONAL STATES.

17. THE INSTRUMENT OF THE AGREEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO CONTAIN CERTAIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ESSENTIAL ITEMS, OF WHICH THE MOST IMPORTANT ARE THE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES, MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES FOR ENSURING EFF - ECTIVE COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE OBLIGATIONS, AND THE FORM AND NATURE OF GUARANTEES BY OUTSIDE STATES. OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR WEAPON-CARRYING VEHICLES, MILITARY BASES, AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WOULD VARY, AND NOT ALL OF THEM WOULD BE RELEVANT TO ALL NWFZ'S. THESE MATTERS ARE DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER. 8 JULY 1975 END TEXT. DALE

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